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Abstract Closing facilities due to a lack of demand is an unavoidable trend in areas experiencing decreasing
populations. Strategies to prevent critical facilities from closing may be based on the concepts of maximum
benet or minimum cost. With the purpose of determining ecient strategies, we focused on a median
and a maximal covering problem that considers two interacting players: interdiction and fortication. This
study aims to develop an interdiction covering problem with fortication and compare it with a median
problem. We specied the facilities to be grocery stores because justifying their protection is dicult given
that they are private businesses; however, such protection is crucial because they provide a critical public
service. First, we simulated the formulation on a linear urban space to explain the general characteristics
and performance of the models. Second, we employed the formulation on a practical dataset to consider the
heterogeneity of urban spaces. The result shows that, for models in a uniform space, the peripheral area is
prioritized for protection when a lower level of damage is expected, while the central area is prioritized when
more damage is expected. Moreover, these general characteristics can be sensitive to the spatial distribution
of facilities.
Keywords: Facility planning, discrete optimization, critical facilities, fortication
1. Introduction
In the particular case of the public facility location problem, unlike that of the private fa-
cility location problem, the objectives are more complicated to legitimize and quantify [10].
Hence, utilizing facility location solutions rooted in the well-known p-median location prob-
lem (a median method) [10] or the maximal covering location problem (a covering method)
[3] for practical decision-making processes requires several additional considerations to be
taken into account, such as attributes, criticalities and changes in the environment. Fur-
thermore, in several occasions, situations in which the number of facilities decreases can also
be considered assuming two dierent objectives: maximizing the decline in accessibility and
minimizing the decrease in accessibility of facilities. While the former is similar to situa-
tions such as terrorist or military attacks, the latter can reect the protection or restoration
strategies of facilities from damage, closure, malfunction or nancial diculties. The latter
scenario is considered to be more suitable in the planning of location strategies for public
facilities. Higher accessibility can be described as a decrease in the sum of the weighted
distance of users or more coverage of users within a certain distance from each facility.
This paper aims to explain how the decline/damage in accessibility can be minimized
by protection strategies of critical facilities using two concepts of measures, a median and a
covering method, focusing on the applicableness of each method in dierent situations. More
specically, although much of the literature on facility location modeling has been directed
towards formulating new models and modications to existing models [6] to nd optimal
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solutions or observe the performance of formulations using existing or random data, the
implications on a general urban space have rarely been considered in a way that is useful
in the planning process. Thus, there is a need to provide a qualitative explanation of
the generalized characteristics of the fortication problem with respect to how the model
works in an urban area. In this sense, a linear urban space is used to present the general
environment with a homogeneous demand. Evaluating the result of varying degrees of
damage and fortication can oer ideas about which facilities can be vulnerable and should
be protected to make the system more robust according to the expected amount of total
damage and total cost of protection. In addition, a case study of the application of data from
a real urban space is presented to determine the eects of a heterogeneous distribution of
facilities and demands. These results are used to draw implications for the implementation
of facility fortication in practical situations. Considering both the median and the covering
problems will help decision makers to compare the results from each viewpoint they would
take.
This paper consists of six chapters. Chapter 2 provides an overview of previous studies
on optimization problems related to diminishing facilities and on protecting facilities as a
countermeasure. Chapter 3 presents the formulation of the dened problems using a median
method and a covering method. In Chapter 4, the features of a change in accessibility result-
ing from damage and fortication are elucidated on a linear urban space. Chapter 5 analyzes
the facilities that should be protected based on the level of the demand relative to that of
damage, using an actual geographical dataset, from the two dierent viewpoints. Chapter
6 provides practical considerations and suggestions on the performances of strategies from
two dierent viewpoints regarding accessibility in an urban space.
2. Literature Review
The concept of fortication, or protection, stemmed from a large number of studies on the
development of reliable systems [17]. A set of studies on reliability addressed disruptions,
namely interdiction problems, for example, natural disasters or attack strategies. Church
et al. [5] formulated a median and a covering problem, named RIM/RIC (r-interdiction
median problem/r-interdiction covering problem), to identify critical facilities under the as-
sumption that disruptions are maximized by \attacking," \sabotaging," or \interdicting"
critical facilities. In short, RIM is dened as nding the subset of r facilities out of the p dif-
ferent supply locations that, when removed, yields the highest level of increase in weighted
distance. The formulation uses the following notation:
i = index representing places of demand (i 2 N)
j = index representing locations of existing facilities (j 2 F )
ai = a measure of demand
dij = the shortest distance between demand i and the facility at j
r = the number of facilities to be eliminated or interdicted
Tij = fk 2 F jk 6= j; dik > dijg.
Additionally, the following decision variables are considered:
xij = 1 if demand i is assigned to a facility at j, 0 otherwise
sj = 1 if a facility at j is eliminated, 0 otherwise.
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Then, RIM can be formulated as follows:
maximize
X
i
ai
X
j2F
dijxij (2.1)
subject to
X
j2F
xij = 1;8i (2.2)X
j2F
sj = r (2.3)X
k2Tij
xik  sj;8i; 8j: (2.4)
Objective (2.1) is to maximize the sum of the weighted distances after the interdiction of
r facilities. Constraint (2.2) keeps each demand assigned to one facility after interdiction.
Constraint (2.3) means that the total number of interdictions is r facilities. Constraint (2.4)
assigns each demand to the closest remaining facility.
RIC is dened as nding the subset of r facilities of the p dierent service locations that,
when removed, maximizes the decline in coverage. To formulate RIC, consider the following
notation:
Ni = the set of j that covers demand i
Also, the following decision variables are considered:
yi = 1 if demand i is no longer covered, 0 otherwise
Then, RIC can be formulated as follows:
maximize
X
i
aiyi (2.5)
subject to yi  sj;8j 2 Ni; 8i (2.6)X
j2F
sj = r: (2.7)
Objective (2.5) maximizes the total population no longer covered after interdiction. Con-
straint (2.6) provides the limitation that demand i is no longer covered only when each
facility j that covers demand i has been removed. Constraint (2.7) is the same as constraint
(2.3) of RIM.
As a related approach, Aksen et al. [1] suggested a capacitated model as an extended
version of RIM. On the other hand, Miyagawa et al. [14] discussed the robustness of a system
of regularly positioned facilities based on the accessibility of facilities on the assumption that
both disruption/closures and new openings would occur.
Fortication models have been studied as a further step towards the identication of
facilities that protect, fortify, or preserve the functionality of the system as much as possible
in the occurrence of external disruptions (Aksen et al. [1]). Therefore, the problem seeks
the next expected maximum damage to be minimized. Brown et al. [2] suggested the basic
concept of applying bi-level and tri-level optimization models that feature an intelligent
attacker and defender that have transparent information and whose actions are sequential
with respect to each other. Church et al. [4] provided the basic formulation with a certain
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interdiction and fortication amount. Liberatore et al. [12] employed a fortication strategy
against stochastic interdictions to make the problem more robust.
Chapter 3 explains the basic formulation of the r-interdiction median problem with
fortication by Church et al. [4] and its modication into a covering problem.
3. Formulation of Protection Problems
If the defender-attacker model is viewed as a protection-closure problem, accessibility can
be evaluated using (1) the minimum weighted distance for users (a median problem) and
(2) the maximum number of users covered within a certain distance (a covering problem).
The median problem considering protection was formulated in a previous study [4]. In this
study, a protection-closure problem based on the covering problem will be formulated as
an additional approach. The covering problem seeks the best strategy in terms of equality
while the median problem is often used to pursue maximum eectiveness. This choice can
be explained as follows. With the median problem, there is the possibility of a demand to
be assigned to a signicantly distant facility, which is not desirable, especially for a society
with aged members contributing to demand. On the contrary, the covering problem tries to
foreclose those extreme cases.
Particularly in the case of locating critical public services such as health care centers
[15] or re stations [16], the maximal covering problem is adopted and modied; in contrast,
numerous applications using the median problem postulate that some sacrice should be
endured for the benet of the majority (e.g. day care centers [11]). It is notable that, in the
location problem for competing/private facilities, the median method minimizing average
customers' travel cost to attract as many customers as possible [7] [8] [9]. Therefore, it
is the decision maker's role to choose which goal the strategy should strive towards. In
this regard, it is valuable to interpret the dierence of the general form of results from
dierent viewpoints. For instance, the neighborhood theory has often been adopted to plan
new residential district with the neighborhood centers located to provide widely needed
services within walking distance. Although walking distance has diering denitions, it is
desirable to contemplate the threshold of walking distance of mobility-impaired people such
as elderly or handicapped people. Consequently, using two dierent methods can support
decision making processes in which dierent standpoints and subjects lie with according to
cases.
3.1. r-interdiction median problem with fortication (RIMF)
According to the notation in RIM, ai is the demand population i(i 2 N), dij is the distance
to the nearest facility j(j 2 F ) from i, and r is the number of facilities to be closed.
Here, consider the additional notations:
H = set of every possible interdiction pattern with r out of p existing facilities
h= index of a specic interdiction pattern (h 2 H)
Bhi = the set of interdicted facilities in pattern h located closer than d
h
i from demand i
q= number of facilities to be fortied/protected.
The closure/attack/interdiction is independent, composing a pattern h(h 2 H), and dhi
is the distance to the nearest facility that is not closed with a pattern h from i. The sum
of the weighted distances to the unclosed facility for a given closing pattern, WDh, can be
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expressed as follows:
WDh =
X
i
aid
h
i (3.1)
where
Bhi = fj 2 F jdij < dhi g;8i 2 N; 8h 2 H: (3.2)
If q facilities are assumed to be protected or fortied, the decrease in the weighted distance
attributable to protection is the following:
ai(d
h
i   dij); 8j 2 Bhi : (3.3)
The r-interdiction median problem with fortication (RIMF), which minimizes the max-
imum increase in the weighted distance attributable to closure, is formulated as follows:
minimize W (3.4)
subject to xhij  zj;8i 2 N; 8h 2 H; 8j 2 Bhi (3.5)X
j2Bhi
xhij  1;8i 2 N; 8h 2 H; jBhi j  2 (3.6)
W 
X
i2N
aid
h
i  
X
i2N
X
j2Bhi
ai(d
h
i   dij)xhij; 8h 2 H (3.7)X
j2F
zj = q (3.8)
xhij = f0; 1g (3.9)
zj = f0; 1g; (3.10)
where xhij is a decision variable with a value of 1 if demand i is assigned to fortied facility
j in interdiction pattern h and 0 otherwise. zj has the value of 1 if a facility j is fortied
and 0 otherwise.
Constraint (3.5) forbids demand i to be assigned to interdicted facility j 2 Bhi unless
fortied. Constraint (3.6) states that a demand is assigned to at most one facility in the
event that the closing pattern h occurs. This demand can be assigned to either the closest
non-interdicted facility or the closest fortied facility. It is more ecient to reduce the
size of the membership of Bhi by calculating only for the case of jBhi j  2, because when
jBhi j = 1, xhij is no longer needed as the only option for improving the weighted distance for
the i with the given pattern h is to fortify site j. In that case, zj becomes the substitute of
xhij in equation (3.7). Furthermore, when there is no fortication anticipated (q = 0), WDh
remains unchanged as equation (3.1). Constraint (3.7) calculates the weighted distance after
fortication with interdiction pattern h. For each interdiction pattern, the change in the
weighted distance attributable to fortication is calculated. For each demand i, W remains
unchanged unless the closest facilities are interdicted with h. Constraint (3.8) ensures that,
in total, only q facilities are fortied. Constraint (3.9) and Constraint (3.10) denes xhij and
zj are binary.
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3.2. r-interdiction covering problem with fortication (RICF)
Likewise, let yij represent a binary variable that has a value of 1 if facility j covers demand
i. Given interdiction pattern h, yhi has the value of 1 when demand i is covered and 0
otherwise.
More concretely, when the total population covered WC h after a certain interdiction
pattern h can be calculated using summation (3.11), the calculation can be improved using
fortication with increment of (3.12), where Mi is a set of facilities that cover demand i.
WC h =
X
i
aiy
h
i (3.11)
ai(yij   yhi );8j 2Mi; 8i 2 N (3.12)
The r-interdiction covering problem with fortication (RICF), which maximizes the cov-
ered population, is formulated as follows:
maximize V (3.13)
subject to xhij  zj; 8i 2 N; 8h 2 H; 8j 2Mi (3.14)X
j2Mi
xhij  1;8i 2 N; 8h 2 H; jMij  2 (3.15)
V 
X
i2N
aiy
h
i +
X
i2N
X
j2Mi
ai(yij   yhi )xhij;8h 2 H (3.16)
(3.8); (3.9); (3.10): (3.17)
Constraint (3.14), corresponding to (3.5) in RIMF, forces demand i to be assigned only
to interdicted facilities that are fortied. Constraint (3.15) limits each assignment for a
demand i to only one facility in the pattern h. Constraint (3.16) maximizes the coverage loss
by the interdiction pattern h, which will be minimized in equation (3.13) by fortication.
In equation (3.16), improvements in coverage by fortication can be only achieved when
jMij is larger than 1 (see Constraint (3.15)). It is on account that, when there is only
facility j covering demand i in the given interdiction pattern h, the only option available
for fortication that leads to improvement is to fortify j, and therefore, zj will replace x
h
ij in
equation (3.16). This corresponds to the explanation for equation (3.7) in section 3.1. The
remaining constraints are equivalent to Constraint (3.8), (3.9) and (3.10), respectively.
4. Solutions to a Linear Urban Model
As mentioned, it is important to understand the basic characteristics of the values achieved
by consideration of the formulated problems. A linear-shaped simplied urban form is
employed for that purpose. Suppose the population is spread uniformly throughout a linear
space with a length of 180 and facilities (p = 9) exist on this space at a regular interval of
20. Hereafter, explanation of the worst-case pattern is provided according to the location
of r facilities to be closed.
First, considering the total distance in the median problem, two issues appear obvious:
(i) the increment of the total distance is higher for closure of facilities on the fringes compared
with those at the midsection and (ii) the increment increases with connected closures, which
are interdictions of adjacent facilities at the same time. If we suppose the increment of the
total distance from the closure of one facility to be 1 in the midsection, the increment from
the closure of one facility in the fringes is 1.5 times larger. The increment also becomes 1.5
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times per facility if two facilities in the midsection close. Furthermore, in the midsection, the
increment increases to 2 times when three facilities close and 2.5 times when four facilities
close. For connected closures on the fringes, the increment is 2.5 times when two facilities
close, 3.5 times when three facilities close, and 4.5 times when four facilities close.
We calculated the results for both problems formulated in the previous chapter, RIMF
and RICF, to verify the improvement in accessibility. Calculation results were generated
using NUOPT 13.0 on an Intel i7 CPU (2.93GHz with 8GB of RAM). In general, execution
time increases according to the size of r and q, respectively (see Table 1, Table 2, Table 3
and Table 4). The value of r plays a critical role in computation time in that it multiplies
the size of H, jHj. For example,if the level of interdiction is r = 2 in Table 1, the number
of combinations of jHj is 9C2 = 36 while it is 9C1 = 9 when r = 1. In Table 3 and 4, jHj is
276 when r = 2 while it is 16 when r = 1. It is also observed that calculation time begins
to decrease after a certain level of q.
In response to these worst-case patterns, RIMF can make the system robust by taking
into account prevention of increments to the total distance where possible (Table 1 and
Figure 1). Figure 1 shows only one of the results of the protection patterns. The objective
values are shown in Figure 3. According to these results, adopting the median method
supports the following protection strategies: (i) when the number of closed facilities r is
small, fortication should be performed on the fringes and (ii) if the number of facilities to
be possibly fortied increases, fortication is best performing in regular segments to prevent
connected closures. Furthermore, (iii) when closed facilities are the majority, fortication is
conducted rst on facilities in the midsection. Finally, (iv) a larger q is more eective for a
larger r.
In contrast, using a covering method, suppose that the covering distance is 15 and the
population is concentrated in the center of each segment with an interval distance of 10.
The covering distance is set so that it can cover every population and it does not generate
any unnecessary facility, which is longer than 10 and shorter than 20. The total population
covered after the closure of facilities is calculated as the objective value. As a result, similar
to the median method, two observations are made for the worst-case patterns: (i) the
decrement of the objective value is larger with closures of facilities on the fringes compared
with those in the midsections and (ii) the decrement becomes larger when the closed facilities
are connected in the case of multiple interdictions. This situation is explained as follows:
the covered population does not decrease when one facility in the midsection closes, but
it does decrease for one segment when a facility on the fringes closes. Note that a loss of
population occurs for one segment if two connected facilities in the midsection close. The
loss becomes 4/3 times and 3/2 times as large for three and four connected closures in the
midsection, respectively. For connected closures that occur on the fringes, the loss becomes
3/2 times for two facilities, 5/3 times for three facilities, and 7/4 times as large for four
facilities, which indicates a sharper decrease than for the midsections.
To achieve optimal robust protection patterns against the worst-case interdictions, RICF
was employed. Table 2 and Figure 2 show the results. Only one of the results is shown for
interdiction on multiple facilities. The objective value of each q is shown in Figure 4.
The improvement of accessibility by one additional protection (increase of q) appears
larger when the size of damage (r) increases. Compared to Figure 3, the third fortica-
tion, the improvement of accessibility by one additional protection appears larger when r
increases. Observe that there are marginal gains in improvement for both RIMF and RICF
according to the level of q. This means that, after a certain amount of protection, no sub-
stantial improvement is expected; therefore, the level of protection is excessive. The results
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Table 1: Results of RIMF (a linear space)
Existing Interdicted Interdiction Remaining Fortied Optimal forti- Total Execution
facilities facilities pattern facilities facilities cation patterns distance time
p r jHj p  r q z WD sec
9 0 - 9 - - 90 -
1 9 8 0 120 0.02
1 (*) 120 0.01
2 (1,9) 110 0.03
3 (1,*,9) 110 0.05
4 (1,*,*,9) 110 0.01
5 (1,*,*,*,9) 110 0.01
6 (1,*,*,*,*,9) 110 0.03
7 (1,*,*,*,*,*,9) 110 0.02
8 (1,*,*,*,*,*,*,9) 110 0.02
2 36 7 0 190 0.05
1 (*) 190 0.02
2 (1,9) 150 0.13
3 (1,*,9) 150 0.36
4 (1,*,*,9),(2,4,6,8) 150 0.53
5 (1,3,5,7,9) 130 0.52
6 (1,3,5,7,9,*) 130 0.34
7 (1,3,5,7,9,*,*) 130 0.34
3 84 6 0 300 0.02
1 (*) 300 0.05
2 (2,8) 210 0.99
3 (2,5,8) 180 13.42
4 (2,4,6,8),(1,4,6,9) 170 10.47
5 (1,3,5,7,9) 150 13.42
6 (1,3,5,7,9,*) 150 5.06
4 126 5 0 450 0.03
1 (*) 450 0.33
2 (3,7) 290 37.80
3 (2,5,8) 210 104.61
4 (2,4,6,8) 190 99.98
5 (1,3,5,7,9) 170 140.98
5 126 5 0 640 0.08
1 (5) 480 1.00
2 (3,7) 310 43.11
3 (2,5,8) 240 514.92
4 (2,4,6,8) 210 404.16
6 84 3 0 870 0.06
1 (5) 550 11.97
2 (3,7) 350 160.36
3 (2,5,8) 270 628.25
7 36 2 0 1140 0.03
1 (5) 660 18.48
2 (3,7) 410 161.95
8 9 1 0 1450 0.02
1 (5) 810 15.22
r=1                                               r=2                                                r=3                                             r=4
r=5                                               r=6                                                r=7                                             r=8
q
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
q
0
1
2
3
4
existing facility
fortified facility
interdicted facility
Figure 1: Results of RIMF in a linear urban space (p = 9)
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Table 2: Results of RICF (a linear space)
Existing Interdicted Interdiction Remaining Fortied Optimal fortication Demand Execution
facilities facilities pattern facilities facilities patterns covered time
p r jHj p  r q z WC sec
9 0 - 9 - - 18 -
1 9 8 0 17 0.02
1 (1),(9) 17 0.03
2 (1,9) 18 0.05
3 (1,*,9) 18 0.02
4 (1,*,*,9) 18 0.02
5 (1,*,*,*,9) 18 0.08
6 (1,*,*,*,*,9) 18 0.01
7 (1,*,*,*,*,*,9) 18 0.01
8 (1,*,*,*,*,*,*,9) 18 0.02
2 36 7 0 15 0.01
1 (*) 15 0.14
2 (1,8),(1,9),(2,9) 16 0.41
3 (1,*,9) 16 0.55
4 (1,*,*,9) 16 1.67
5 (1,3,5,7,9) 18 0.05
6 (1,3,5,7,9,*) 18 0.05
7 (1,+.+,+,+,9) 18 0.05
3 84 6 0 13 0.09
1 (*) 13 0.53
2 (1,8),(1,9),(2,8),(2,9),   14 2.70
3 (1,4,7),(2,5,8),(3,6,9) 15 4.20
4 (1,4,6,8),(1,4,6,9), 16 5.69
(2,4,6,8),(2,4,6,9)
5 (1,3,5,7,9) 18 0.22
6 (1,3,5,7,9,*) 18 0.22
4 126 5 0 11 0.05
1 (*) 11 1.09
2 (1,9),(2,6),(3,7),(4,8),   12 13.53
3 (2,5,8) 14 26.16
4 (2,4,6,8) 16 44.23
5 (1,3,5,7,9) 18 0.75
5 126 5 0 9 0.05
1 (5) 10 1.05
2 (2,6),(3,7),(4,8) 11 49.92
3 (2,5,8) 13 153.86
4 (2,4,6,8) 16 10.88
6 84 3 0 7 0.05
1 (4),(5),(6) 8 2.41
2 (3,6),(3,7),(4,7) 10 159.06
3 (2,4,6),(2,5,8),(4,6,8) 12 285.39
7 36 2 0 5 0.03
1 (3),(4),(5),(6),(7) 6 1.86
2 (2,5),(2,6),(2,7),(3,6),(3,7), 8 44.31
(3,8),(4,7),(4,8),(5,8)
8 9 1 0 3 0.02
1 (2),(3),(4),(5),(6),(7),(8) 4 0.44
r=1                                               r=2                                                r=3                                             r=4
r=5                                               r=6                                                r=7                                             r=8
q
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
q
0
1
2
3
4
existing facility
fortified facility
interdicted facility
Figure 2: Results of RICF in a linear urban space (p = 9)
Copyright c by ORSJ. Unauthorized reproduction of this article is prohibited.
Protection Strategies for Retail Facilities 47
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
W
D
 
q 
r=1
r=2
r=3
r=4
r=5
r=6
r=7
r=8
Figure 3: Total weighted distance in the results of RIMF
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Figure 4: Total population covered in the results of RICF
correspond to those for RIMF and indicate that (i) the protection is best conducted on the
fringes if r is small, (ii) the protection becomes more eectively used as fortication at reg-
ular intervals if q increases to prevent connected closures, (iii) when the value of r is greater
than half of the total number of facilities, the midsection is assigned to be protected rst to
prevent a large connected closure on the fringes, and (iv) a larger q is more eective when
r increases. Although the results seem the same qualitatively, the patterns appear dierent
as compared to those of RIMF. To summarize, it was attempted to determine, in a general
sense, in which location the protection should be provided to avoid the worst damage with
expected size of damage using a linear urban model. Notwithstanding the generality of the
linear model, eects due to non-uniformity of distribution cannot be taken into account.
5. Optimal Protection Patterns for Closures in a New-town
In the previous section, the fundamental function of the formulated problems was elucidated
given the assumption of a uniform urban space. However, because real urban space is not
homogenized, agglomeration or distribution patterns of facilities and demands can aect
the optimization result. In the following, applications of RIMF and RICF are implemented
as examples of planning strategies for shopping diculties, based on a real urban spatial
dataset. Shopping diculties, also called \food desert" problems, have become more obvious
with a decreasing and aging population, especially in suburban areas where urban density is
declining. For the location problem related to providing fresh groceries daily, two surrogate
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measures are considered for optimization of overall accessibility: convenience and equality
as discussed. In this context, grocery stores are retail facilities that function as public
infrastructure. If we consider that grocery shopping is crucial for a dignied daily life, those
stores ought to be provided at a minimum level.
Towards this end, hereafter, discussions focus on practical results by applying RIMF
and RICF to supermarkets (SMs) and neighborhood centers (NCs) in a new-town that is
experiencing an increase in its elderly population. The area of our case study is Senri New-
town, Sakai, Osaka prefecture. The average age of the population is around 45 years and the
elderly population comprises 23.7% of the total population, both of which are higher than
the average for the country (in 2005). In particular, the area poses shopping diculties
for elderly people on account of closures of neighborhood centers which consist of small
retail providers [13]. In addition, elderly people are disadvantaged compared to others in
traveling long distance in general, and thus they prefer using neighborhood centers that are
easily accessible rather than supermarkets. Therefore, in this case, protection is considered
an inducement policy or a subsidy provided to retail stores in the declining area. Because
of the focus on relieving risks of shopping diculties for elderly people, only the elderly
population is used in this study.
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Figure 5: Locations and covering population of supermarkets (left) and neighborhood cen-
ters (right)
Figure 5 shows the locations of grocery stores in this area. The stores include 11 su-
permarkets and 13 neighborhood centers (p = 24). The supermarkets include those outside
of the boundary of Senri New-town within a 500 meter buer, as people inside can use the
stores located in outside area and vice versa. Supermarkets are numbered from 1 to 11, and
neighborhood centers are numbered from 12 to 24. Supermarkets are mostly concentrated
near three railway stations, which are designated as regional centers by planning, whereas
neighborhood centers are distributed to provide equal cover for the local demand, where
possible. Here, the optimal protection patterns are calculated for the cases with number of
interdictions r equal to 1 and 2. A larger p results in a considerably larger computational
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complexity because the combination of patterns of r increases exponentially.
Table 3 shows the results of the protection patterns calculated using the median method
and Table 4 shows the results using the covering method. On the optimal fortication pat-
tern, supermarkets are indicated in bold. The decrement of total distance column shows
how much of an improvement in accessibility could be achieved by the corresponding for-
tication pattern. Execution time is the elapsed number of seconds spent on calculating
the corresponding problem. The next interdiction pattern indicates the interdiction pattern
on facilities to occur after the optimal fortication. The choice of covering distance here
resembles to the approach shown in Chapter 4. That is, considering that planned neigh-
borhoods and regional centers are 16 districts in total, the minimum distance to cover the
entire area (1,160 ha) is approximately 270 meters. Therefore, the covering distance of each
facility in the model is xed at 500 meters, which is widely adopted as the approximate
maximum walking distance of elderly people and larger than 270 meters. Geographic pat-
terns of fortication and interdiction in RIMF and RICF are depicted in Figure 6 and Figure
7, respectively. Accessibilities, represented by the total weighted distance in RIMF and by
the total population covered in RICF, are shown in Figure 8 and Figure 9, respectively,
according to the number of closures and protections. Although neighborhood centers have
a higher priority in both case, it is notable that, in RICF, which assumes that accessibility
is equal when using a facility within a certain distance, a supermarket located solely in the
fringe area (see SM 10) is designated to be protected at a higher priority. Note that SM 4
does not have priority for protection as it has little demand covered, even though it is in
the fringe area in terms of location.
Table 3: Fortication results of RIMF
] ] Optimal fortication pattern Total Decrement Execu- Interdic-
interdicted fortied distance of total tion tion
facilities facilities distance time pattern
r q bold = supermarket WD=1; 000 =1; 000 sec
1 0 - 9,235.4 - - 12
1 12 9,223.1 -122.6 0.01 24
2 12,24 8,986.4 -236.7 0.01 21
3 12,21,24 8,849.7 -136.7 0.02 18
4 12,18,21,24 8,773.7 -75.9 0.01 17
5 12,17,18,21,24 8,771.2 -2.5 0.01 19
6 12,17,18,19,21,24 8,725.4 -45.8 0.01 10
7 10,12,17,18,19,21,24 8,718.2 -7.2 0.01 22
8 10,12,17,18,19,21,22,24 8,616.8 -101.4 0.01 16
9 10,12,16,17,18,19,21,22,24 8,566.0 -50.7 0.01 23
10 10,12,16,17,18,19,21,22,23,24 8,547.1 -18.9 0.01 13
11 10,12,13,16,17,18,19,21,22,23,24 8,522.3 -24.9 0.00 14
12 10,12,13,14,16,17,18,19,21,22,23,24 8,516.1 -6.2 0.01 15
13 10,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,21,22,23,24 8,509.7 -6.4 0.01 20
2 0 - 10,078.0 - - 12,24
1 12 9,830.4 -247.6 0.14 10,24
2 12,24 9,822.2 -8.2 2.49 18,21
3 12,21,24 9,242.9 -579.3 2.08 17,18
4 12,18,21,24 9,164.5 -78.4 4.23 17,19
5 12,17,18,21,24 9,116.2 -48.3 4.72 20,22
6 12,17,18,20,21,24 9,116.2 -0.1 11.69 10,19
7 10,12,17,18,21,22,24 9,007.5 -108.6 20.60 16,19
8 10,12,17,18,19,21,22,24 8,888.3 -119.2 19.46 13,14
9 10,12,13,17,18,19,21,22,24 8,802.3 -86.0 49.02 16,23
10 10,12,13,16,17,18,19,21,22,24 8,746.0 -56.3 17.45 14,15
11 10,12,13,15,16,17,18,19,21,22,24 8,713.4 -32.6 2.17 3,23
12 10,12,13,14,16,17,18,19,21,22,23,24 8,645.3 -68.1 4.86 15,20
13 10,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,21,22,23,24 8,599.2 -46.1 51.00 1,20
For r = 1 (Table 3), the results of RIMF show that (i) stores expected to be interdicted
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Figure 6: Results of RIMF (r = 2)
8000
8500
9000
9500
10000
10500
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
W
D
 (
1
0
3
 m
) 
r=1 r=2
q 
Figure 7: Accessibility in RIMF based on the number of protected facilities and interdicted
facilities
Copyright c by ORSJ. Unauthorized reproduction of this article is prohibited.
Protection Strategies for Retail Facilities 51
q=0                            q=1                           q=2                           q=3                           q=4
q=5                            q=6                           q=7                           q=8                           q=9
q=10                          q=11                         q=12                         q=13                         q=14
supermarket
neighborhood center
fortified
interdicted
Figure 8: Results of RICF (r = 2)
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Figure 9: Accessibility in RICF based on the number of protected facilities and interdicted
facilities
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Table 4: Fortication results of RICF
] ] Optimal fortication pattern Demand Increment Execu- Interdic-
interdicted fortied covered of demand tion tion
facilities facilities covered time pattern
r q bold = supermarket WC sec
1 0 - 17,980 - - 21
1 21 18,133 153 0.19 12
2 12,21 18,260 127 0.25 10
3 10,12,21 18,557 297 0.19 18
4 10,12,18,21 18,700 143 0.23 24
5 10,12,18,21,24 18,738 38 0.25 19
6 10,12,18,19,21,24 18,989 251 0.23 22
7 10,12,18,19,21,22,24 19,009 20 0.23 23
8 10,12,18,19,21,22,23,24 19,047 38 0.23 17
9 10,12,17,18,19,21,22,23,24 19,155 108 0.25 13
10 10,12,13,17,18,19,21,22,23,24 19,400 245 0.30 15
11 10,12,13,15,17,18,19,21,22,23,24 19,461 61 0.23 20
12 10,12,13,15,17,18,19,20,21,22,23,24 19,512 51 0.20 14
13 10,12,13,14,15,17,18,19,20,21,22,23,24 19,634 122 0.16 6
2 0 - 16,479 - - 12,21
1 21 16,759 280 19.08 10,21
2 12,21 17,183 424 23.17 10,18
3 10,12,21 17,623 440 27.04 18,24
4 10,12,18,21 17,804 181 27.05 19,24
5 10,12,18,21,24 18,072 268 28.92 1,22
6 10,12,18,21,22,24 18,113 41 33.87 19,23
7 1,10,12,18,19,21,24 18,321 208 41.04 13,14
8 10,12,13,18,19,21,22,24 18,422 101 51.40 17,23
9 10,12,13,18,19,21,22,23,24 18,657 235 58.27 16,17
10 10,12,13,17,18,19,21,22,23,24 18,931 274 75.53 14,15
11 10,12,13,15,17,18,19,21,22,23,24 19,126 195 62.79 5,16
12 5,10,12,13,15,17,18,19,21,22,23,24 19,339 213 44.05 14,20
13 5,10,12,13,14,15,17,18,19,21,22,23,24 19,461 122 24.59 7,20
must be protected in the next fortication step and (ii) stores that are supposed to be
protected in the previous fortication step must also be included in the next fortication
step. Neighborhood center (NC) 12 has the highest priority for fortication, and its location
features a high population and no competitive stores within a short distance. As the number
of fortifying stores q increases from q = 1 to q = 6, only NCs are selected to be fortied. The
most critical supermarket is SM 10, which is standalone. Other supermarkets are located
in groups with other supermarkets or near stations. As shown in Figure 8, the decrease in
the total sum of the distances is largest when q = 2.
The result diers for r = 2 (Table 3) in that even stores that are supposed to be fortied
in the previous fortication step may not necessarily be included in the next fortication
pattern (for example, see q = 7). Similar to the case of r = 1, only NCs are protected, up
to q = 6. The decrement is largest when q = 3, which is extreme.
Meanwhile, when r = 1, the results of RICF indicate that stores that are supposed to
be interdicted are necessarily included in the next fortication patterns, similar to the case
with RIMF. NC 21 has the highest priority and NC 12 and SM 10 take the next highest.
The priority of SM 10 is higher in the covering method than in the median method.
For r = 2, among the supermarkets, SM 10, SM 1, and SM 5 are included in the
fortication patterns as q increases but not in sequence. That is, although SM 1 and SM
10 are supposed to be protected when q = 7, only SM 10 remains when q = 8, and SM 5
and SM 10 are protected when q = 12. Moreover, for both r = 1 and r = 2, the maximum
increase in coverage occurs when q = 3 (Table 4). Nevertheless, the impact of stores with
the highest priority on an increase in accessibility is relatively lower when compared with
the results of RIMF.
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Considering the results of both RIMF and RICF, the importance of supermarkets is
higher when the covering method is used compared with the median method, particularly
for SM 10.
The results in this chapter show dierent features compared to those in Chapter 4.
Although the protection priority lies with the fringes on a uniform space when r is relatively
small, this result does not generalize to a practical situation. For example, comparing
the results of r = 2 and q = 1, the most-desired facility to protect is NC 12 in RIMF
and NC 21 in RICF. Comparing locations, NC 12 is located near the center, whereas NC
21 is on the peripheral area. This result can also be seen between supermarkets: SMs
located outside of the boundary are not prioritized when the demand is not uniform. On
the other hand, it is observed that the agglomeration of facilities|for example, SM 1, 2
and 3|makes the facilities in the group more robust towards damage, which results in
little improvement in system robustness from the protection of individual facilities within a
group. As a consequence, it is seen in both RIMF and RICF that NCs, which are planned
to be located evenly over the area, have higher priority than supermarkets, which occur
in groups. Therefore, these results indicate that the distribution pattern of facilities, or
the spatial relationship between facilities, strongly inuences the protection pattern, even
compared to the absolute location of a facility in the area. These characteristics were not
observed in the uniform space analyzed in the previous chapter.
As previously noted, the majority of supermarkets form groups, whereas neighborhood
centers are dispersed. In other words, supermarkets are regarded as having a complementary
relationship with one another but neighborhood centers do not. In addition, supermarkets
are located in such places as stations, which provide transit convenience and, hence, have
a low elderly population nearby; however, neighborhood centers have more elderly people
living around them. This situation implies that neighborhood centers should be protected
prior to supermarkets.
6. Concluding Remarks
In this study, we proposed interpretations of what RIMF and RICF mean which can be
generalized to urban areas. Furthermore, a specic geographical dataset was utilized to em-
phasize the necessity of considering the locational patterns of existing facilities for planning
protection strategies. For the urban spaces in general, higher damage to accessibility is ex-
pected when the facilities in the center are closed compared to those on the peripheral area
when the expected amount of total damage is large, while the peripheral area is prioritized
for protection when the total amount of damage is relatively small. It is also found that the
protection of evenly divided sections is desired when multiple sites can be protected to avoid
overlapping of the protection area of each protected facility. However, this generalization
can be violated for some distributions of demand and facilities as seen in Chapter 5 when
facilities in the center could also be prioritized for protection.
Moreover, using the median and covering methods, the actual patterns can dier even
with the same r and q, although the evaluations are similar. Therefore, these methods may
provide a more detailed and persuasive basis for decision-making processes with respect to
related policies. At the same time, oering an optimal strategy that accommodates the
expected disruption/damage and potentially constrained planned budgets is crucial.
Generalizing the closure and protection problems of facilities on a linear urban space
with a regular pattern made clear that the protection patterns for critical facilities do
not depend only on the importance level of the facilities, especially with potentially large
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closures. Suppose that the amount of damage expected is r = 3, which was not possible to
calculate at this time because of the limited calculation performance. For three supermarkets
concentrated near the station such as SM 1, 2, and 3, the protection priority for these
supermarkets can be raised. The risk of diminution of accessibility attributable to the
damage can be sharply reduced if only one among the group is protected. The results of
the linear urban spaces in Chapter 4 correspond to this phenomenon, and showed that a
greater eect results from setting up the strong points of fortication in the midsections as
r increases.
Future research may consider the application of closure in the risk minimizing approach,
which was not considered in this study. Modeling the actual behavioral pattern of users
and employing this pattern into the calculation of accessibility is also important for future
research.
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